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Abstract—Autonomous vehicles (AVs) use diverse sensors to
understand their surroundings as they continually make safetycritical decisions. However, establishing trust with other AVs is a
key prerequisite because safety-critical decisions cannot be made
based on data shared from untrusted sources. Existing protocols
require an infrastructure network connection and a third-party
root of trust to establish a secure channel, which are not always
available.
In this paper, we propose a sensor-fusion approach for mobile
trust establishment, which combines GPS and visual data. The
combined data forms evidence that one vehicle is nearby another,
which is a strong indication that it is not a remote adversary
hence trustworthy. Our preliminary experiments show that our
sensor-fusion approach achieves above 80% successful pairing of
two legitimate vehicles observing the same object with 5 meters
of error. Based on these preliminary results, we anticipate that a
refined approach can support fuzzy trust establishment, enabling
better collaboration between nearby AVs.

I. I NTRODUCTION
As we add more autonomous and semi-autonomous vehicles
(AVs) to our roads, their effects on passenger and pedestrian
safety are becoming more important. Despite extensive testing
before deployment, AV systems are not perfect at identifying
hazards in the roadway [1], [2]. Although a particular AV’s
sensors and software may not be 100% accurate at identifying
hazards, there is untapped pool of information held by other
AVs in the vicinity that could be used to more quickly and
accurately identify roadway hazards before they present a
safety threat.
Enabling coordination between untrusting AVs is a
significant challenge [3], [4], [5]. Because AVs are safetycritical systems, they cannot make decisions based on data
from untrusted external sources. Existing vehicle-to-vehicle
(V2V) standards lack a workable trust scheme for vehicles and
the data they share. Consider the scenario depicted in Figure 1:
A vehicle ( 3 ) driving down a narrow side street in a
densely-populated city comes to a stop at an intersection with
a busy road. The vehicle needs to turn into the busy road,
but parked cars and trees prevent the driver from seeing cross
traffic. Other vehicles ( 1 and 2 ) on the busy road have a
clear view of traffic conditions, and they could alert vehicle
3 ) when it is safe to turn.

Fig. 1: Vehicles in the roadway gathering visual data from
objects. The keys they generate will be based on overlapping
observations of moving objects.

If the occlusions in the roadway are too large, vehicle 2
may not be visible to vehicle 3 , and it could be dangerous to
begin the turn immediately after vehicle 1 passes. In our
experience driving in dense urban environments, situations
like these arise frequently, and they could be easily prevented
with coordination. But even simple AV coordination—in the
scenario, vehicle 2 broadcasting its position and velocity to
vehicle 3 —requires some reliable method to establish trust.
As a first step toward enabling AV coordination, we need a
mechanism by which AVs can establish mutual trust. Existing
V2V coordination standards like DSRC [6], C-V2X [7], and
WAVE [8] rely on a public key infrastructure to authenticate
the source of transmissions. But mobile AVs may not always
be able to rely on a centralized trust broker, e.g., in areas
with spotty cellular coverage. Since we know that the most
prevalent class of attack on cyber-physical systems involves a
physically remote attacker [9], [10], our goal is to establish
mutual trust among vehicles by taking advantage of dynamic
observations of the physical environment.
In this work, we lay out the considerations behind building
a workable trustworthy V2V coordination system. We then
put forward a preliminary architecture for a secure V2V trust
system, including a description and evaluation of an earlystage prototype.
The motivation behind this work is that evidence of proximity is a proxy for trust, even – under the right circumstances –
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in a public space. Here we build on our previous contributions
to zero-involvement pairing and authentication (ZIPA), which
is a suite of techniques for producing trust and encryption
tokens from correlated environmental noise. With little coordination overhead, two nearby vehicles that observe the same
scene can prove to one another that they are nearby. The
techniques we present are also applicable in other scenarios
like CCTV networks in which nearby devices wish to establish
trust using visual observations in order to coordinate.
Our proposal addresses the problem of low-latency trust
for use in vehicle-to-vehicle coordinations. We begin by discussing the desired properties of a trustworthy V2V coordination system along with some high-level ideas about what the
shape of a solution should be. Finally, we present a prototype
implementation that achieves the goals that we set out in our
design objectives and suggests some future directions.

the attacker was not physically nearby. We base our threat
model on this vector. Our adversary, Eve, does not have
physical access to the communicating vehicles’ immediate environment, although she can access archival information such
as aerial photographs, satellite images, or publicly available
photographs (e.g., Google Street View). Beyond this, Eve can
observe broadcast communications between legitimate users
Alice and Bob and can broadcast her own messages. However,
she cannot gather detailed information about the location and
motion of objects in real time.
This threat model excludes physically onboard attackers
such as those supposed in the work on Jeep hacking [12].
Onboard attackers are in a position to do far more than spoof
trust. We treat physical proximity as a source of trust. The
threat model is practical in the case where an adversary is
unaware of the exact location of their target. In this threat
model, it is unbeknownst to the attacker where to strike.

II. D ESIGN O BJECTIVES
Here we discuss the challenges, threat model, and the
properties of our solution to the trust establishment problem.
A. Challenges of V2V Trust Establishment
Recent attempts to build V2V trust establishment from
shared observations of the roadway have met only moderate
success [11]. The main difficulty is finding a source of
environmental entropy that is highly correlated for legitimate
observers in the roadway but unobservable outside of the
roadway. The state of the art in V2V trust establishment
is Convoy [11], which uses low-cost sensors to generate
correlated random numbers from environmental noise. Convoy
produces keys at a rate on the order of one bit per second,
which may be insufficient for real-time trust establishment.
As such, pairing with low-cost sensors is limited to specialized
applications where conditions do not evolve quickly and slow
key generation is acceptable.
AVs have richer sensors on board like LIDAR and cameras.
A challenge in using the sensors on an AV is that two vehicles
observing the same scene from different angles will generate
different raw image data. To use these observations as a trust
token, we need a function that maps two or more “similarenough” observations of the same environment to the same
binary sequence. For example, one camera may capture a
complete view of only the North side of a roadway while
another may capture a complete view of only the South side
of the same roadway as in Figure 1. The whole process
is complicated by the fact that observations of the physical
environment contain error. Getting accurate observations of the
physical environment is central to proving that two vehicles
that wish to establish trust are in the same location. Although
there may be some overlap in the images they capture,
extracting and identifying that overlap without divulging too
much information to an eavesdropper is difficult.
B. Threat Model
Recent attacks on critical infrastructure [9], [10] have a
shared threat model: the attack was launched over the network;

C. Properties of Our Proposed Solution
A V2V trust scheme needs three properties: it is peer-topeer for practicality, it uses environmental information for
trust, and is low latency for safety.
Peer-to-peer: Vehicles in a peer-to-peer networks transmit
information to others that are within broadcast range without
incurring long latency to a remote datacenter. Distant vehicles
outside the single-hop wireless range are also outside of the
local traffic pattern and do not need the information being
shared about the immediate surroundings. And by eliminating
reliance on datacenters for facilitating information sharing,
we can reduce the attack surface of AV networks. Without
a centralized hub of coordination, it is more difficult for
an adversary to compromise traffic safety on a large scale.
However, peer-to-peer coordination makes trust establishment
more difficult because each vehicle on the road must be able
to establish trust with any other vehicle on the road.
a) Proximity is Trust: Based on our threat model, physically distant participants are untrustworthy. Pragmatically, they
also may not possess relevant information, since environmental
conditions change. Conventional approaches to trust establishment such as distributing individual secret keys to each car on
the roadway are not scalable in peer-to-peer networks because
of the coordination overhead they incur. Thus, only physically
nearby AVs are candidates for trust.
This design goal is shared by work on context-based zero
involvement pairing and trust (ZIPA), a method for transparently validating another device’s legitimacy to join a network
based on location [13], [14]. Observations are authenticated by
real-time environmental observations, allowing participants to
generate a shared key by harvesting environmental noise. We
use a philosophy motivated by ZIPA to prevent remote attackers from authenticating themselves to legitimate vehicles. It
requires all coordinations to be authenticated with observations
of shared environmental context.
b) Latency affects Safety: Vehicle-to-vehicle (V2V) networks allow vehicles to share safety-sensitive information. For
example, one vehicle can inform another about environmental
dangers such as an object on a roadway. At high speeds, e.g.,
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automobiles or drones, a lengthy trust protocol can endanger
the participants. Fast trust matters.
III. R ELATED W ORK
In other projects, authors have used point clouds and other
visual data to approximate indoor localization and zero involvement trust.
a) Indoor Localization: Our work considers the outdoor
localization problem. Other researchers have considered the
indoor problem. Inaccuracies of a GPS, when indoors, pose
a problem for devices that rely on GPS data for navigation.
One solution lies in cost effective depth sensors (a Kinect for
example)[15], [16], [17] which effectively allow for devices
to navigate indoor environments. Our work relates to indoor
localization by both areas of research requiring accurate location algorithms. However, an indoor localization project solely
focuses indoor navigation which currently addresses singular
device navigation rather than a system of devices.
b) Zero-Involvement Pairing and Authentication (ZIPA) :
ZIPA refers to the idea of encrypting data based on a device’s
current position [14], [13]. Our work relates to these works
by sharing a mutual goal of encrypting data using localization.
However, these works are different because they use stationary
GPS measurements. Our work aims to deal with coordinates
that can change in each frame.
IV. O UR A PPROACH TO T RUSTWORTHY V2V
C OORDINATION
Our approach uses the sensors present on an AV to find
the location of objects in the roadway. The results are used as
the basis to generate a key. Since the estimate of an object’s
location may be different depending on the vantage point of
the observer, it cannot be directly used to authenticate vehicles.
To deal with errors in object location estimates, we use a fuzzy
extractor to convert an object’s approximate position to a bit
sequence on which all observers of the scene can agree.
Because a principal objective of this work is to build a key
that can only be computed by observers that are physically
located in the roadway, we use only moving objects as
the basis for the keys. Stationary objects like signposts and
buildings could be observable using other means (such as from
satellite imagery or historical observations of the roadway) and
should not contribute to the key.

Algorithm 1: Algorithm to generate fuzzy extractor
entities from observations of the roadway.
Input: A GPS reading G
Input: A point cloud P = {p1 , p2 , . . . , pN }
Input: A leniency parameter q
Input: Randomly chosen GPS coordinate points
E = {e1 , e2 , . . . , eL }
Output: A subset f of E
/* Segment point clouds

*/

objects[] ← segmentP ointCloud(P )
/* Find GPS location of centroid of each object.

*/

for k ← 1 to length(objects) do
/* cent[k] is relative location of centroid (x,y)
*/

cent[k].x ← mean(objects[k].points.x[])
cent[k].y ← mean(objects[k].points.y[])
/* cent[k].gps is estimated GPS coords of centroid
*/

cent[k].gps ← halversine(G, cent[k])
/* Fuzzy point selection

*/

for k ← 1 to length(E) do
if ||E[k] − cent[k].gps||2 < q then
append(f, E[k])
return f

Algorithm 2: Encoding algorithm to ensure no private
information leakage.
Input: f a list of points gathered from Algorithm 1
Input: EC an Elliptic Curve known to all AVs
Input: A field Fp
Output: K a list of encoded points
/* p is the prime number of the field Fp

*/

for k ← 1 to length(f ) do
/* f[k].x/y are the GPS coords generated in Algo 1
*/
/* round refers to a function that rounds to a
decimal place.

*/

i = |round(f [k].x ∗ f [k].y, 5) ∗ p| mod p
/* EC.G is the generator point associated with
the given elliptic curve.

*/

K.append(i ∗ EC.G)
return K

A. Algorithm Overview
Our algorithm works in three steps:
1) We segment a point cloud from the Kinect into clusters.
Each cluster represents an object in the scene. We then
calculate the centroid of each cluster.
2) We estimate the absolute GPS coordinates of the centroid
of each object from step 1. This is accomplished by
adding the distance to the centroid to the GPS coordinates
of the Kinect using the Halversine Equation.
3) We then draw a circle of fixed radius around each centroid
from step 2 and select points within that circle to be used
as private information.

B. Segmenting Point Clouds into Objects
The Kinect generates point clouds of approximately two
million points at a frequency of 1-2 Hertz. These point
clouds must be segmented to identify which points belong to
individual objects in the surrounding environment. We segment
these objects using the difference of normals algorithm [18].
We remove background and stationary objects such as
the ground, buildings, posts, etc. at this stage because their
locations are remotely observable from satellite imagery. The
remaining data represents dynamic objects in the environment
that are changing location between frames.
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Fig. 2: Sensor Fusion-Based key generation pipeline.

Fig. 3: Our prototype mounted to a vehicle.
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Fig. 4: Alice and Bob use a constellation of points to prove
that they are located near one another.
C. GPS Location Estimation
Next, we calculate the centroid of each object in the
segmented point clouds generated in §IV-B. The centroids
are the private data shared only among legitimate AVs. The
coordinates of the centroids are calculated from point clouds
generated by the Kinect, which are reported relative to the
point of observation (i.e. the location of the Kinect). We calculate the absolute location of each object’s centroid by adding
the coordinates of the observation point (measured by GPS) to
the relative location reported by the Kinect. Observations of
the same object from two different vantage points may have
error of up to 10 meters, caused by uncertainty in location
reported by the GPS.
D. Fuzzy Key Generation
Finally, from estimates of the object’s centroid we generate a
key that can be publicly shared without leaking information to
an eavesdropper Eve, based on our threat model. Figure 4 show
two scenarios where Alice and Bob are trying to establish
trust. The circles for Alice and Bob enclose
N a point cloud
with a particular centroid (marked with
). In Figure 4(a),
Alice and Bob’s estimates of the object’s centroid are different
enough to represent a case where the overlap of the circles are
too small to authenticate. Whereas, in Figure 4(b), Alice and
Bob’s estimates of the object’s centroid are similar enough

to properly authenticate even though their centroids differ. In
Figure 4, p, q, r, s and t are elements in the set E elements
from Algorithm 1 which Alice and Bob want to exchange.
However, Alice and Bob still have one more problem. If
either one of them sends their list over a public channel, an
adversary can estimate what Alice’s private centroid could be.
Therefore, Alice and Bob encode their points. Our prototype
implementation uses a simple elliptic curve encoder which is
described in Algorithm 2. Elliptic curves are fast, secure, and
every component of an elliptic curve can be public[19].
V. P RELIMINARY E VALUATION
We evaluated our prototype with data gathered on roads near
our office building. This evaluation focused on point cloud
estimation, fuzzy key generation and fuzzy key quality. The
keys produced by our prototype are 256 bits in length.
a) GPS Location Estimation: The estimated GPS coordinates of the centroid computed in Algorithm 1 have some
expected error. We measured that error to be in the range of
5 − 10m. Figure 6 shows the match rate of fuzzy extractor
entities f as a function of error in the centroid location
estimate. Figure 5 shows a contour map of match rate as
a function of position estimate near our department’s office
building. The green X at the center of Figure 5 represents
the true location of an object’s centroid, and the contour lines
represent the match rate of fuzzy extractor entities at nearby
locations.
b) Fuzzy Key Generation: For our real-world data, we
evaluated perceived centroids from our prototype and simulated point set agreement over varying fake centroids. Figure
5 shows how estimated centroids, located in the center of
the figure, vary over latitude and longitude. Other points,
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T EST
F REQUENCY
B LOCK F REQUENCY
C UMULATIVE S UMS
RUNS
L ONGEST RUN
R ANK FFT
N ON -OVERLAPPING
OVERLAPPING
U NIVERSAL
A PPROXIMATE E NTROPY
S ERIAL
L INEAR C OMPLEXITY

R ESULT
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
5
3
3
3

H2H[20]
3
3
3
5
5
3
3
5
5
3
5
3

TABLE I: NIST test results with data from our fuzzy extractor
(3indicates pass and 5 indicates failure).
besides the reference point, were simulated. The contours
are overlayed over a to-scale satellite image of where the
test subject was standing; a error radius of ten meters was
used as a constant for the creation of the figure. The figure’s
contours depict distance limits where the percentages every
point within the contour have a greater percentage than the
contour outlining the area. The figure is able to characterize
the fuzzy limits of a ten meter error limit over latitude and
longitude differences.
c) Randomness Of Generated Bit Streams: We gathered
14 million bits using simulated real-number centroids to
properly evaluate randomness of our keys. To evaluate key
randomness of our fuzzy key generation algorithm, we used
the NIST randomness test suite[21]. As shown in our other
work[22], ZIPA schemes have trouble passing the NIST test
evaluation. However, Table I demonstrates that our fuzzy key
generation algorithm has no trouble passing almost all of the
tests. For comparison, we also show NIST test results from
Heart 2 Heart [20], which has about average performance
relative to other ZIPA schemes. The results of the NIST test
imply our algorithm’s bit sequences are strong enough to be
sent over a public channel.
VI. C ONCLUSIONS
Our sensor fusion approach is a promising starting point on
which to build trust based on applied computer vision in AVs.
It supports peer-to-peer coordination using proof of proximity.
A full system implementation will require further investigation
into implementation details on an real AV. For our techniques
to be useful in real AVs, estimates of centroid location must
be fast to compute and accurate. This can be accomplished by
using more powerful computers and more responsive sensors

such as LIDAR or stereo cameras—topics that we are currently
investigating.
We also did not discuss algorithms for selecting objects in
the roadway that should be used for trust establishment. In
our preliminary evaluation, we used a rudimentary algorithm
along with a dataset that focused on one or two subjects in
the frame of view. But current AVs have more sophisticated
techniques for identifying moving objects and forecasting
their trajectories, which could be used as inputs to our trust
establishment mechanism.
A major advantage of our techniques is that the penalty
of trust failure is low: in a crowded roadway, many vehicles
are observing the same scene from different vantage points,
and a hazard will likely be observable by more than one
vehicle. If one legitimate AV with useful information about the
hazard fails to establish trust with a second vehicle, that useful
information can still be shared by other vehicles with the same
information. And AVs can always fall back on their own local
sensors to corroborate information they receive from others. In
this work, we don’t discuss corroboration techniques, but they
are an important piece of an AV trust establishment system
and a topic of future work.
Our algorithm has several limitations which are open directions for further research. Low-entropy environments, such as
an open field, will likely lack objects in proximity for our trust
establishment algorithm. Therefore, a research direction is to
choose among objects for use in key generation, e.g., building
on object detection methods to distinguish “suspicious” objects
or to focus on moving objects.
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